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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
ROBERT HAROLD BOAZ,

Case No. 940245-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for fraudulent offer
or sale of securities, a felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-1; offer or sale of unregistered securities, a felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7; and offer or sale of
securities by an unregistered agent, a felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-3(1), in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley,
presiding.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ROBERT HAROLD BOAZ,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940245-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2) (f) , whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

See also Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) .

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in Addendum A:

vn

§ 61--1--1
61--1--3(1)
§ 61--1--7
61--1--21
§ 76--2--103
76-• 2 - -304
76--3--201
76--3--202(5)
§ 76--3--203
§ 76--3--301

un

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

I0i

Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Utah Code
Utah Code

un vn

Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did the trial court misinterpret the securities law penalty
provision, which excludes a term of imprisonment for offenders who
have no knowledge of the (violated) rule or order, by erroneously
sentencing Mr. Boaz to a term of imprisonment when his plea only
established a willful, but unknowledgeable, offense?
"When examining a trial court's interpretation of a
statutory provision we apply a correction of error standard."

State

v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241
(Utah 1991); State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991) ("trial
courts do not have discretion to misapply the law"); State v.
Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted)
(appellate courts "will set aside a sentence imposed by the trial
court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, if the trial
judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the
sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law").
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION
Utah law recently defined the term, "willful", for purposes
of the securities law provisions.
(Utah 1993).

State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355

Case law has not analyzed, however, whether the

punishment of imprisonment must always apply to willful securities
law offenders.

Under the plain language of the securities law

penalty statute, persons who act willfully, but with "no knowledge of
the (violated) rule or order", are the lone class of offenders not
subject to imprisonment albeit other punishments apply.
is needed to clarify the issue.
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An opinion

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
fraudulent offer or sale of securities, a felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1; offer or sale of unregistered securities, a
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7; and offer or sale
of securities by an unregistered agent, a felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3(1).

See (R 463-73; 579). On February 11,

1994, Mr. Robert Harold Boaz entered a conditional guilty plea to
the above offenses, reserving his right to appeal various issues. 1
On March 21, 1994, following a waiver of the time required
for sentencing, the court sentenced "Mr. Boaz to zero to three years
in the Utah State Prison on each of the three charges that he pled
to[,] M with the terms imposed consecutively.
note 6.

(R 609); £f_. infra

The prison terms were stayed, however, in favor of a 36

month period of probation.

(R 609-11).

Terms and conditions of probation included 6 months in the
Salt Lake County jail with credit given for 14 days served; a

1. As part of Mr. Boaz's plea agreement, "the state and
the Court agree that defendant does not waive his right to appeal
the denial of the Motion to Dismiss filed for Lack of Jurisdiction,
and accompanying documents and arguments in support thereof, but
rather enters pleas conditionally preserving that right of
appeal . . . "
(R 461). Following a motion, stipulation, and order
from this Court, Mr. Boaz reasserted his jurisdictional arguments in
a supplemental brief. Mr. Boaz's jurisdictional arguments were
advanced personally by him, in propria persona. See, e.g.,
(R 201-96) . The nonjurisdictional arguments herein do not
constitute a waiver of jurisdiction but are done pursuant to the
representations made below to the court and in the docketing
statement. See (R 545) & Motion filed February 6, 1995.
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restitution order of $12,000 to Kirk Newman and $5,000 to George
Birch (with a hearing provided for in the event of a dispute); 200
hours of community service (monitored by AP&P); and a $250
recoupment fee to the Legal Defender Association.

(R 609-10) .

Pursuant to the parties' statements in the plea agreement, the court
stayed the actual execution of its sentence pending disposition of
Mr. Boaz's case on appeal.

(R 611).

STATEMENT OF THE, FACTS
The facts relevant to the sentencing order are alluded to
above, but were more specifically addressed at sentencing:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . .
We would assert that
Mr. Boaz would qualify for the treatment of Utah Code
Section 61-1-21 wherein no person may be imprisoned
for the violation of any rule or order if he proves
that he has no knowledge of the rule or order. Simply
because Mr. Boaz entered a plea of guilty to the
charges, does not inherently mean that he was
admitting that was was aware of the rules. As we have
discussed extensively during the plea, as well as the
Court is aware of the willful standards, willful
standards as defined by C. Dean Larsen, which is just
the desire to engage in the conduct or cause the
result. Mr. Boaz pleaded guilty because there was a
scienter element. He never admitted he intended to
defraud anybody or he intended to violate any rules or
statutes. On the contrary, he has insisted he was
unaware of it, his conduct was violative of any rule.
He is not educated in this area. He had no knowledge
of the intricacies of securities law but based upon
the willful standards and lack of scienter, he did
enter his plea. We'd ask the Court to consider any
form of incarceration inappropriate and the statute
takes into consideration that there are individuals
who will fall within the purview of violating the
securities laws, but would not fall due to their lack
of expertise or knowledge or scienter, if you will,
would not fall within the punitive sanction of
incarceration.
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THE COURT:

Thank you, [counsel].

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I suppose in sum our
position would be this Court ought not to impose jail
time with Mr. Boaz at all. There are other forms of
punishment that this Court could take that would be as
effective to Mr. Boaz. It should be noted that he's
served 12 days in jail [sic] at this point on this
matter; that for someone in his situation, with the
kind of background he has, where he has actually been
involved in chaplaincies, if you will, and been into
prisons before and then [found] himself in this
situation. Under the circumstances, . . . [it] has
been a punishment in and of itself. It has been quite
a bit of embarrassment in his own community with
individuals. I believe the recommendation for jail is
inappropriate.
The other recommendations, I believe, would
accordingly be a p p r o p r i a t e . . . .
(R 599-601).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The securities law penalty provision punishes willful and
knowledgeable violators with fines and/or imprisonment.

"Willful"

has been defined by statute and in a securities law decision as the
"desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result".

Under that

narrow definition, Mr. Boaz's plea merely established a "willful"
but unknowing violation.

By statute, a willful but unknowing

violation is less punishable than a willful and knowledgeable
violation.
not.

The former prohibits imprisonment while the latter does

Because Mr. Boaz falls under the willful but unknowledgeable

situation, the court's order of imprisonment should be vacated.
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ARGUMENT
PUNISHMENTS FOR VIOLATIONS COMMITTED WILLFULLY BUT
WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE VIOLATED RULE OR ORDER MAY
NOT INCLUDE A TERM OF IMPRISONMENT
Under the Utah Uniform Securities Act, an Act in and of
itself, the penalty provision for securities violations contains a
clause without a counterpart in the criminal code.

Section 61-1-21

of the Securities Act prohibits the penalty of imprisonment if a
defendant establishes that he had no knowledge of the rule or order
which had in fact been violated:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of
this chapter except Section 61-1-16, or who willfully
violates any rule or order under this chapter, or who
willfully violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the
statement made to be false or misleading in any
material respect, shall upon conviction be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both. No person may be imprisoned for the
violation of any rule or order if he proves that he
had no knowledge of the rule or order. No indictment
or information may be returned or complaint filed
under this chapter more than five years after the
alleged violation.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1988) (emphasis added) 2 ; cj£. Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-3-203; 76-3-301.
Mr. Boaz acknowledges the three year period of imprisonment
penalty, but, because of the accompanying (underscored) clause, the

2. The 1988 version of 61-1-21, quoted above, has since
been modified although the language of the underscored clause has
remained the same. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1988), with
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (Supp. 1994). The 1988 version applies
here because of the date of the offense, a fact duly noted by both
parties. See generally (R 461-71). Unless otherwise indicated, all
statutory references are from 1988 (amendments since 1988, if any,
would not alter the analysis).
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penalty of imprisonment would be inapplicable to his unknowing
violation.
"When faced with a question of statutory construction, this
court first examines the plain language of the statute."
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993).

State v.

While the plain language here

allows for imprisonment, the very next statutory clause prohibits a
term of imprisonment if there is "no knowledge of the rule or
order."

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21.

The "imprisonment" language

initially stated should not be read in isolation.

See Utah State

Road Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 831 (Utah 1984) ("terms of the
related code provision should be construed in a harmonious fashion");
M. Silver v. Auditing Div. of the State Tax Comm'n, 820 P.2d 912,
914 (Utah 1991) ("In construing the statute, we follow the rule that
the terms of a statute should not be interpreted in a piecemeal
fashion, but as a whole").
Importantly, the accompanying "no imprisonment" prohibition
does not dispense with punishment altogether nor does it preclude
the imposition of fines.

Rather, incarceration is the only

punishment listed which may be avoided.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21;

accord (R 601) (appointed counsel for Mr. Boaz conceded that
punishments other than imprisonment "would accordingly be
appropriate").
The legislature's decision to include "imprisonment" and
"no imprisonment" text in the same penalty statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-21, together with recent case law on the meaning of
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"willful", State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993), reveals that
a securities violation committed willfully may not necessarily have
been also committed with "knowledge of the rule or order".
Otherwise, if no distinction existed between the willful requirement
and such knowledge, the "no knowledge of the rule or order" clause
would be rendered superfluous.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21.

By

statute, a willful violation does not have to include a term of
imprisonment, id., and a willful violation may occur without
"knowledge of the rule or order."

Id.

In Larsen, a securities fraud case involving provisions
similar to the ones involved here, defendant Larsen asked the "court
to interpret 'willfully' as requiring 'scienter,' the intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud, . . . "
(citation omitted).

Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1358

Finding a lack of support in the plain language

of the statute, the supreme court rejected Larsen's arguments.

"If

the legislature had wanted scienter for perceived public policy
reasons, it could have included that requirement.
we will not."

_Id. at 1360.

It did not, and

The court refused "to engraft a

judicially created intent requirement upon the plain language of a
criminal statute."

Jd. at 1358. 3

According to the court: "An individual must act willfully
to be criminally liable under the statute.

This means that the

3. Defendant Larsen's claimed parallels to federal law
were unpersuasive because "he fails to recognize that the Utah
legislature has not required the courts to interpret the Utah
Uniform Securities Act in lockstep with federal decisions." Larsen,
865 P.2d at 1360.
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prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
'desire [d] to engage in the conduct or cause[d] the result.'"
at 1360 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103).

Id.

The court's willful

definition is consistent with the penalty provision of the
securities act in that a violation may have been committed willfully
(i.e. through a desire to engage in the conduct or cause the
result), but that the violation need not also have been committed
with "knowledge of the rule or the order."

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21.

In essence, such knowledge under the securities fraud
penalty statute includes three different scenarios.

One, a person

has knowledge of the rule or order and commits no wrongdoing.

No

penalty applies.
Two, a person has knowledge of the rule or order and
willfully commits a violation.

Such a violator "desire[s] to engage

in the conduct or cause [s] the result" and the violator does so
while cognizant of the applicable (violated) rule or order.
Imprisonment is appropriate for such a willful and knowledgeable
violation.

A fine also may apply.

Id.

And three, a person has no knowledge of the rule or order,
but willfully commits a violation in the manner defined by our
supreme court.

865 P.2d at 1360.

A person who acts willfully but

without knowledge of the rule or order is less culpable than a
person in the second situation.

The less culpable offender still

remains subject to punishment, however, albeit the penalty of
imprisonment does not apply.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21.

falls under the last example.
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Mr. Boaz

During the entry of plea proceedings, held on February 11,
1994, Mr. Boaz's plea included a "willful" violation but only as
that term was defined by the Larsen case. 4

(R 574-75) .

4. During the plea proceedings, after the court recounted
the factual basis for the involved offense, Mr. Boaz's willful
acknowledgment was clarified for the court:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, just for clarification as
we discussed under the C. Dean Larsen opinion of willful
and the way that term is defined. Mr. Boaz would admit
that he acted willfully, not that he acted with any
scienter or any intent to defraud. He is not admitting
that.
THE COURT: Have you had a discussion with Mr. Boaz
regarding, you probably have, the distinction between
"willful" in terms of an intent to defraud versus "willful"
being defined as the desire to engage in the conduct itself?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We have. . . .
In fact, also as we
entered these negotiations we received from the state a
comment which I think was most helpful in encouraging
Mr. Boaz to accept this. That is, [the State] indicated to
us to remind Mr. Boaz this count 4 that deals in fraud is
not the common law fraud that we are often hearing about
and talking about, but a securities fraud situation as
alleged which has the willfulness to something other than,
I suppose, the intent element that is commonly referred
to. I believe that it is that comment and explanation, as
much as anything, that assisted Mr. Boaz to distinguish
between what he was being charged with and how the Court
was interpreting that from the Larsen opinion and prepared
him to enter this plea today.
THE COURT: Mr. Boaz, with that amplification, did you
engage in that conduct willful[ly]?
MR. BOAZ:

Yes, as it has been defined.

(R 574-75) . The limited nature of the willful standard again was
emphasized for the other counts and also during the sentencing
proceedings.
(R 576); see supra Statement of Facts (quoting
[R 599-601]).

- 10 -

Acknowledging nothing more than "willful" acts (i.e. "the desire to
engage in the conduct itself"), Mr. Boaz's representations
established "no knowledge of the rule or order".

(R 575).

Consequently, even though such willful conduct subjected him to
punishment, the penalties listed by statute may not include
imprisonment.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21.

M. Silver v. Auditing Div. of the State Tax Comm'n, 82 0
P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1991), lends analogous support.

In Silver, the

defendant appealed a tax penalty on the grounds that his mental
state (or lack thereof) did not fall under the proscriptions of a
tax penalty statute.

Silver argued that the mandate of the statute,

which required proof of an "intent to evade", was not satisfied by
merely acknowledging not "do[ing] that which the law, in fact, may
require."

See id. at 915.

"Silver concede[d] that he did not

intend to file [tax] returns, but that this state of mind was based
on an understanding, apparently mistaken, that he was not obligated
to file under state or federal law."

Id. at 914.

He argued that an

intent greater than a conscious objective was required before the
penalty applied.
On appeal, the supreme court agreed.

A person who acts

intentionally may not necessarily have acted with the intent "to
avoid a legal requirement with which the actor knows he or she is
obligated to comply[.]"

See id. at 915 (emphasis added).

A willful

violation, standing alone, was not enough to invoke the involved
penalty.

But see id. at 916 ("It may be that Silver is liable for

some other, lesser penalty, a point we do not address[.]").

- 11 -

The principles in Silver apply equally to the case at bar. 5
In both cases, there is an acknowledged "conscious objective or
desire to accomplish the prohibited end."

Compare 820 P.2d at 914

("Silver concedes that he did not intend to file returns"), with
(R 600) (Mr. Boaz's act or omission was "just the desire to engage
in the conduct or cause the result").

For the involved penalty to

apply, in both cases "it is not sufficient that the actor merely
intends not to do that which the law, in fact, may require."
Silver, 820 P.2d at 915 (emphasis added) (the $1,000 tax penalty is
inapplicable if a willful violator does not also evade legal
requirements with which he "knows he . . .

is obligated to comply");

5. The main thrust of the court's analysis in Silver is
reprinted below:
[The tax penalty statute] requires that one have an "intent
to evade" a tax or legal requirement before one is exposed
to the penalty of up to $1,000 imposed by that section.
The usual meaning of the term "intent" is that one must
have a conscious objective or desire to accomplish the
prohibited end. The object of the required intent under
[the tax penalty statute] is "to evade" the requirements of
the tax laws. "Evade" is defined as avoidance of something
by effort, skill, dexterity, contrivance, subterfuge,
ingenuity, or artifice. We read the term "intent to
evade," then, to require a conscious desire to avoid a
legal requirement with which the actor knows he or she is
obligated to comply; it is not sufficient that the actor
merely intends not to do that which the law, in fact, may
require. In short, an intent not to file a tax return,
even though required to law to file, is an "intent to
evade" only if the actor is aware that he or she is legally
required to file.
M. Silver v. Auditing Div. of the State Tax Comm'n, 820 P.2d 912, 915
(Utah 1991) (citations omitted).
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cf. (R 599-601) (emphasis added) (the securities law penalty of
imprisonment is inapplicable if a willful violator does not also act
with "knowledge of the [violated] rule or order").

Although other

penalties potentially apply, the punishment appealed should not be
allowed.

Compare Silver, 820 P.2d at 916 ($1,000 tax penalty was

disallowed), with (R 599-601) (order of imprisonment should be
disallowed).
The "no knowledge" provision barring imprisonment is a
securities law penalty limitation unlike anything contained in the
punishment section of the criminal code.

Compare Utah Code Ann.

§ 61-1-21, with Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201(5)(a); 76-3-203;
76-3-301.

If the legislature had intended for the imprisonment

penalties statutes to all be the same, it would have done so.

See

Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1360 ("It did not, and we will not").
Under the minimum mandatory statutes, for instance, the
sentences range in terms of high, medium, or low severity.

Utah

Code Ann. § 76-3-201(5) (a) . Yet, even when persuaded by a showing
of mitigating circumstances (a clause marginally similar in function
to the "no knowledge" securities provision), the court's minimum
sentence still must include a term of imprisonment.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-3-201(5) (d) . Unlike under the securities provision, a "no
knowledge" showing for minimum mandatory crimes would not provide a
basis for avoiding incarceration.
Under the criminal code indeterminate sentencing statutes,
varying terms of imprisonment are set forth, but there is no
accompanying provision prohibiting imprisonment if persons show no

- 13 -

"knowledge of the rule or order."
§ 76-3-203(3) .

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann.

Imprisonment may be stayed or avoided through other

means, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (probation), although no provision
provides the opportunity afforded by the "no knowledge" securities
clause.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21.
At best, once a court imposes imprisonment for an

indeterminate offense,6 the Parole Board may later rely on a "no
knowledge" showing in order to shorten further periods of
incarceration.

Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(5) (if so persuaded,

the Board may exercise its discretion and discharge the inmate).
The court itself, however, is not bound statutorily once such
knowledge is presented under the criminal code indeterminate
sentencing scheme.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.

Limitations on

incarceration are only provided by the securities law penalty
provision.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21.

In fact, the "no knowledge" securities provision leaves the
court with no choice in the matter.

Imprisonment is simply not a

6. The third degree felony section of the indeterminate
sentencing statute provides "for a term not to exceed five years",
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3), although the bar and bench have both
typically referred to the term as "zero-to-five years". See
(R 609). More precisely, however, the statutory language requires a
felon to "be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term
. . . [not to exceed five years.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203; see
also Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (terms for "not more than three years"
are provided for). In other words, at least one day of the prison
term must be served before the Parole Board is theoretically
empowered to release him. In any event, if "a term not to exceed
five years" is imposed, there is no accompanying provision
completely prohibiting imprisonment in the manner provided by the
"no knowledge" securities statute. Compare Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203(3), with Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21.
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viable securities law sentencing alternative if "no knowledge" is
shown.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21.

By comparison, the court's power

under the criminal code indeterminate sentencing scheme is more
discretionary.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201; 76-3-203.

Imprisonment

may or may not be appropriate, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (c), with
the ultimate determination depending on considerations other than
the securities "no knowledge" provision.
In short, 7 the "no knowledge" clause of the securities
penalty section provides the exception to the general rule of
imprisonment under the criminal code.

If the legislature did not

want a "no knowledge" showing to be a securities law limitation on
the sentence of imprisonment, it would have omitted such limiting
language from its provision.

The plain language of the securities

law penalty provision should be followed.

7. Mr. Boaz does not ignore the long standing principle
that ignorance of the law is no excuse. See Smith v. Morris, 690
P.2d 560 (Utah 1984); (R 602). This codified principle, however, is
entirely consistent with the legislature's drafting of the "no
knowledge" securities statute. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304,
with Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21.
The securities provision (which contains "penalties" in its
title) pertains to the sentencing context. Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-21. The text specifically refers to fines and terms of
imprisonment (if applicable). Id. "Upon conviction", securities
violators are subject to its provisions. _Id. By contrast, the
"ignorance of law" provision refers to (in)applicable defenses to
crimes. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304. Limitations to a court's
sentence are not at issue, c£. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21; rather, the
"ignorance" focus is on whether it serves as a defense to "any
prosecution" of a crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Boaz respectfully requests this Court to vacate the
lower court's sentencing order of incarceration.

Punishments other

than imprisonment may have been appropriately imposed below, but the
court's order of imprisonment violates the limitations contained in
the securities penalty statute.
SUBMITTED this

**-l

day of February, 1995.

S.
NAID" S. FUJINO
RONALD
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

RICHARD G. UDAY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

61-1-1. Fraud unlawful.
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
?*£Uf J™* n e c e s s a r y i n <>r<fer to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading- or
(3 engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person

61-1-3. Licensing of broker-dealers, agents, and investment advisers.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this state as a
broker-dealer or agent unless the person is licensed under this chapter.
(2) (a) It is unlawful for any broker-dealer or issuer to employ or engage an
agent unless the agent is licensed. The license of an agent is not effective
during any period when he is not associated with a particular brokerdealer licensed under this chapter or a particular issuer.
(b) When an agent begins or terminates a connection with a brokerdealer or issuer, or begins or terminates those activities which make him
an agent, the agent as well as the broker-dealer or issuer shall promptly
notify the division.

61-1-7. Registration before sale.
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless
it is registered under this chapter or the security or transaction is exempted
under section 61-1-14.

61-1-21. Penalties for violations — Limitation of prosecutions*
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter except Section 61-1-16, or who willfully violates any rule or order under this chapter, or
who willfully violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement made to be false
or misleading in any material respect, shall upon conviction befinednot more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. No person
may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he proves that he
had no knowledge of the rule or order. No indictment or information may be
returned or complaint filed under this chapter more than five years after the
alleged violation.

76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge ;
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent."
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature
of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature ot
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or
with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law.
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves
the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal
law is no defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his
conduct did not constitute an offense, and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resultedfromthe actor's reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or
grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a
court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the law in question.
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a
defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser
included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he
believed.

76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions —
Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with mandatory sentences — Resentencing.
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office;
(c) to probation unteis otherwise specifically provided by l a w ~
J
(d) to imprisonment; or
'
(e) to death.
(5) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
\c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall be guided by sentencing rules regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Judicial Council.

76-3-202. Paroled persons — '.termination or aiscnarge
from sentence — Time served on parole — Discretion of Board of Pardons.
(1) Every person committed to the state prison to serve an indeterminate
term and later released on parole shall, upon completion of three years on
parole outside of confinement and without violation, or in the case of a person
convicted of violating Section 76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-302(l)(e), Section
76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1,
or 76-5-405, or attempting to violate any of those sections, upon completion of
ten years on parole outside of confinement and without violation, be terminated from his sentence unless the person is earlier terminated by the Board
of Pardons. Any person who violates the terms of his parole, while serving
parole, shall at the discretion of the Board of Pardons be recommitted to
prison to serve the portion of the balance of his term as determined by the
Board of Pardons, but not to exceed the maximum term.
(2) Any person paroled following a former parole revocation may not be
discharged from his sentence until either:
(a) he has served three years on parole outside of confinement and
without violation, or in the case of a person convicted of violating Section
76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-302(l)(e), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1,
76-5-402.2, 76-6-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, or
76-5-405, or attempting to violate any of those sections, ten years on
parole outside of confinement and without violation;
(b) his maximum sentence has expired; or
(c) the Board of Pardons so orders.
(3) (a) All time served on parole, outside of confinement and without violation constitutes service of the total sentence but does not preclude the
requirement of serving a three-year or ten-year, as the case may be,
parole term outside of confinement and without violation.
(b) Any time a person spends outside of confinement after commission
of a parole violation does not constitute service of the total sentence unless the person is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the parole.
(c) Any time spent in confinement awaiting a hearing before the Board
of Pardons or a decision by the board concerning revocation of parole
constitutes service of the sentence. In the case of exoneration by the
board, the time spent shall be included in computing the total parole
term.
(4) When any parolee without authority from the Board of Pardons absents
himself from the state or avoids or evades parole supervision, the period of
absence, avoidance, or* evasion tolls the parole period.
(5) This section does not preclude the Board of Pardons from paroling or
discharging an inmate at any time within the discretion of the Board of Pardons unless otherwise specifically provided by law.

76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of imprisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm
used.
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and
not concurrently.

76-3-301. Fines of persons.
(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, not
exceeding:
(a) $10,000 when the conviction is of a felony of the first degree or
second degree;
(b) $5,000 when the conviction is of a felony of the third degree;
(c) $2,500 when the conviction is of a class A misdemeanor;
(d) $1,000 when the conviction is of a class B misdemeanor;
(e) $500 when the conviction is of a class C misdemeanor or infraction;
and
(f) any greater amounts specifically authorized by statute.
(2) This section does not apply to a corporation, association, partnership,
government, or governmental instrumentality.

